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Abstract. In this paper I tackle the question, currently unaddressed in the litera-
WXUHRIKRZWRUHFRQFLOHWKHWHFKQLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµSULYDF\E\GHVLJQ¶ZLWK
WKHQDWXUHRIµSULYDF\¶LQ(8ODZ7KHUHµSULYDF\¶VSOLWVLQWRWZRFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\
protected rights± respect for private and family life, and protection of personal 
data± whose essence cannot be violated. After illustrating the technical notion of 
privacy protection goals and design strategies, developed in the privacy threat 
modelling literature, I propose a method to identify the essence of the two rights, 
ZKLFKUHVWVRQLGHQWLI\LQJILUVWWKHULJKWV¶µDWWULEXWHV¶,DQVZHUWKHUHVHDUFKTXHV
tion by linking the technical notion of privacy protection goals and strategies with 
WKHDWWULEXWHVDQGUHODWHGµHVVHQFH¶RIWKHULJKWVWRSULYDWHOLIHDQGWRWKHSURWHF
tion of personal data. The analysis unveils the need to adjust and further develop 
privacy protection goals. It also unveils that establishing equivalences between 
technical and legal approaches to the two rights bears positive effects beyond 
PbD. 
Keywords: Data protection by design; privacy by design; information security 
canons; protection goals; essence; privacy; data protection; Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. 
1 Introduction 
Privacy by design (hereafter PbD), which stems from PETs but has almost supplanted 
them [1], aims to embed µSULYDF\¶ in information technologies, network and infor-
mation systems and business practice (Cavoukian as in [2]), and possibly also processes 
and physical design [3]. 
The PbD challenge launched by Cavoukian [4] has been keenly taken by computer 
scientists, legal scholars, or a combination of both. Computer scientists have focused 
This is the final manuscript for academic purposes only. Please always refer to 
the published version: 
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tion Goals with the Essence of the Rights to Private life and Data Protection, in M. 
Medina, N. Tsouroulas, K. Rannenberg, E. Schweighofer and A. Mitrakas, Annual 
Privacy Forum 2018, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag (forth-
coming). 
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RQGHYHORSLQJWHFKQLFDOµSURWHFWLRQJRDOV¶WKDWHPEHGOHJDOUHTXLUHPHQWVLQWRVRIWZDUH
and hardware development. This was the case of the authors of the LINDDUN project 
[5], and of the ENISA Paper on engineering PbD [6].  
Legal scholars have highlighted the limitations of PbD requirements stemming from 
the applicable law. Pagallo [7], Leenes and Koops [1], as well as Schartum [2], argue 
that it is not possible to hard±wire legal rules in computer systems, notably because 
legal rules require flexible application [1], [7]. Furthermore, PbD approaches would 
need to be harmonized with the principle of technology neutrality inherent in the appli-
cable law [1]. Importantly, PbD, whether in its form of a legal provision [1], or a stand-
ard [8], should not be seen like a shortcut to ensure automated compliance with data 
protection principles. Rather, the enforcement of those principles always require the 
active intervention of individuals [7, 8, 9, 10]. Another inherent constraint in the im-
plementation of PbD principles, rightly observed by Bieker et al., Kamara and Ra-
chovitsaOD\VLQWKHIDFWWKDWµSULYDF\¶LVDTXDOLILHGULJKWVXEMHFWWRSHUPLVVLEOHOLPLWD
tions. 
All authors studying PbD call for a multi/interdisciplinary approach taking into ac-
count substantive legal understandings of privacy as well as technology and software 
development [1, 2], [9], [11] WRµRSHUDWLRQDOLVH3E'¶0XOWLGLVFLSOLQDU\DSSURDFKHVVHH
computer scientists joining forces with social scientists. Bieker et al. [10] combine PbD 
and legal approaches to develop a methodology for impact assessments. As for inter-
disciplinary approaches, Schartum proposes starting from substantive legal rules to de-
YHORSDPHWKRGWUDQVIRUPLQJ³SULYDF\UXOHVLQWRFRPSXWHUURXWLQHVDQGIXQFWLRQV´[2] 
leading to legally compliant software.1 Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. Le-
JDOO\µSULYDF\¶LVQRWMXVWDPDWWHURIVWDWXWRU\ODZEXWDVQRWHGDERYHDOVRDULJKW[9, 
10], [12]. Yet, international law, which represents the universal framework to respect, 
protect and fulfil human rights, including privacy, is not immediately translatable into 
workable concepts for PbD [9]. In the end of the day, the applicable law addressing 
µSULYDF\¶LVVSHFLILFWRHDFKMXULVGLFWLRQ 
,QWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQKHUHDIWHU(8ZKLFK,IRFXVRQLQWKLVSDSHUµSULYDF\¶VSOLWV
into two constitutionally protected rights: respect for private and family life, home and 
communications, and protection of personal data, enshrined respectively in Articles 7 
and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [13]. These rights can be limited, yet, lim-
itations cannot violate the essence of the rights. Just like PbD, there is an ongoing de-
bate about the meaning of the essence of fundamental rights, [14, 15, 16] [31]. While 
this adds further variables to the search for a workable implementation of PbD, at the 
same time it can also make the identification of clear rules for PbD in EU law easier. 
Thus far, however, scholarship has not linked PbD to the nature of private life and 
data protection in EU law, that is two rights whose essence cannot be violated. This 
paper fills the gap in the literature by asking how to reconcile the technical understand-
ing of PbD with the nature of the two rights in EU law. My proposition is to map the 
                                                          
1
 6FKDUWXP¶V PHWKRGFURVVHVIRXUOHJDOO\LQVSLUHGµGHVLJQWHFKQLTXHV¶ZLWKIRXUVRIWZDUHµGHVLJQ
HOHPHQWV¶7KHUHVXOWLQJPDWUL[LQIRUPVQLQH-stepped iterations (which he sketches, without 
unfortunately developing them). 
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equivalences between the legal concept of the essence of the fundamental rights to pri-
vate life and data protection with the technical notion of privacy/data protection goals. 
The paper develops as follows. In section two, I illustrate existing technical ap-
proaches to PbD. In section three, I expound the nature of privacy in EU law and seek 
to operationalize the two corresponding rights E\LQWURGXFLQJWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHµDWWULE
XWHV¶,SURSRVHKRZWRUHFRQFLOH legal and technological approaches in section four. 
The analysis shows the need for adjusting and further developing privacy protection 
goals. In the concluding section I summarize my findings, and advance the idea that 
establishing equivalences between technical and legal approaches can be applied be-
yond PbD. 
 
2 Technological Approaches: Protection Goals and 
Threats to Privacy 
Privacy by Design can be seen from two complementary angles. The first is a positive 
perspective, whereby PbD consists of devising technical and operational rules to protect 
privacy ± a.k.a. protection goals. The second is a negative perspective, which consists 
in implementing rules to avert threats2 embodied by technology that could damage data 
and communications, thereby affecting the rights of individuals. Hence Pbd represents 
for rules compliance what threat modelling is for rules violation.  
The identification of protection goals and threats is derived from well-established 
approaches to information security. In information security, threats to information, and 
the corresponding rules or canons of protection, are the two sides of threat modelling 
for information security, which is performed by analyzing the system to be protected 
through the lenses of a potential attacker. Threat modelling is part of risk assessment, 
in turn a part of risk management,3 which belongs with information security manage-
ment.  
There exist several models of threat modelling [18, 19, 20, 21], but a reference point 
LQ WKHILHOG LV0LFURVRIW¶V675,'(PRGHO [22, 23]. The name is the acronym of the 
threats that a network and information system could suffer from: spoofing, tampering, 
repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege. These 
threats are the negation of information security canons, chiefly the triad of confidenti-
ality, integrity and availability, a.k.a. CIA [5, 6], and also authentication, non-repudia-
tion, authorization and utility,4 which are canons that have been acknowledged over 
time [17], [24, 25]. Spoofing means that the attacker replaces the verified user of a 
system and is the opposite of authentication. Tampering means corrupting the data and 
is the opposite of integrity. Repudiation, which is the negation of non-repudiation, 
means that an action cannot be correctly associated with its origin. Information disclo-
sure consists in making confidential information available to illegitimate recipients, and 
                                                          
2
 Defined by ENISA in [17]. 
3
 Define by ENISA in [17]. 
4
 1RWHWKDWWKHFDQRQµXWLOLW\¶LVGHILQHGE\WKH,78 [24], but not by ENISA. 
4 
negates confidentiality. Denial of service means making a service unavailable as other-
wise expected, thus negating availability. Finally, elevation of privileges consists in 
gaining access to a system without having the necessary privileges, which challenges 
authorization (a.k.a. control). 
Identifying threats to personal data protection and confidentiality of communica-
tions, and the corresponding rules of protection, can be done by means of threat mod-
elling. However, unlike information security, there is little work on threat modelling in 
the field of privacy [6]. The LINDDUN project [5] and the ENISA study on engineering 
PbD [6] fill the gap by defining protection goals. LINDDUN [5] also contains a fully-
fledged privacy threat modelling.  
2.1 Privacy Protection Goals 
As for protection goals, LINDDUN [5] borrows from Danezis the idea that privacy can 
be either soft or hard. Hard privacy consists in the minimization of disclosure of infor-
mation; consequently, the individual does not need to rely on the data controller for 
protection. It is identified with the protection goal of data minimization: the data, which 
is not disclosed, is secure. Soft privacy consists in the knowledge that information has 
been disclosed, and thus the data subject has to trust the data controller(s). Then, taking 
inspiration from the data protection goals identified by Pfitzman, LINDDUN identifies 
the relevant privacy canons by dividing them into the two categories of hard and soft 
privacy canons. Hard privaF\FDQRQVDUHµXQOLQNDELOLW\¶µDQRQ\PLW\DQGSVHXGRQLP
LW\¶µXQGHWHFWDELOLW\DQGXQREVHUYDELOLW\¶ZLWKWKHDGGLWLRQRIµSODXVLEOHGHQLDELOLW\¶
DQG µFRQILGHQWLDOLW\¶6RIWSULYDF\FDQRQVDUHH[WUDFWHG IURPDSSOLFDEOH ODZDQGDUH
µFRQWHQWDZDUHQHVV¶DQGµSROLF\DQGFRQVHQWFRPSOLDQFH¶VHH7DEOHEHORZ:KLOH
acknowledging the importance of availability and integrity to privacy, LINDDUN does 
not explicitly list them. 
Differently, in the ENISA study [6], Danezis, Domingo-Ferrer, Hansen [26], Hoep-
man [27],0pWD\HU7LUWHDDQG6FKLIIQHUOLVWSURWHFWLRQJRDOVVWDUWLQJIURPWKHFODVVLF
information security CIA triad and then add unlinkability, transparency and intervena-
bility. In the absence of a standard [8], I experimentally attempt to merge the two sets 
of canons. The so-merged protection goals produce: unlinkability (including anonymity 
& pseudonymity, and undetectability & unobservability), plausible deniability, availa-
bility, integrity, confidentiality, transparency (including content awareness and policy 
consent & compliance) and intervenability, as illustrated and described in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Privacy protection goals for LINDDUN and ENISA 
Privacy canons LINDDUN ENISA 
Unlinkability Unlinkability: hiding the link between two or 
more actions, identities, and pieces of infor-
mation. 
Privacy-relevant data cannot be linked across 
domains that are constituted by a common pur-
pose and context, and that means that processes 
have to be operated in such a way that the pri-
vacy-relevant data are unlinkable to any other 
set of privacy relevant data outside of the do-
main. Mechanisms to achieve or support un-
linkability comprise data avoidance, separation 
of contexts (physical separation, encryption, us-
age of different identifiers, access control), 
anonymisation and pseudonymisation, and 
early erasure or data. 
Anonymity: hiding the link between an iden-
tity and an action or a piece of information. 
Pseudonymity: to build a reputation on a pseu-
donym and the possibility to use multiple pseu-
donyms for different purposes. 
Undetectability and unobservability: hiding 
WKH XVHU¶V DFWLYLWLHV HJ LPSRVVLELOLW\ RI
knowing whether an entry in a database corre-
sponds to a real person) 
Plausible deniabil-
ity 
The ability to deny having performed an action 
that other parties can neither confirm nor con-
tradict (e.g. a whistleblower can deny his ac-
tions) [opposite of non-repudiation] 
 
Integrity / The fact that data is accessible and services are 
operational. (ENISA Glossary) 
Confidentiality Hiding the data content or controlled release of 
data content (e.g. encrypted email) 
The protection of communications or stored 
data against interception and reading by unau-
thorized persons. (ENISA Glossary) 
Availability / The confirmation that data which has been sent, 
received, or stored are complete and un-
changed. (ENISA Glossary) 
Transparency Content Awareness: users are aware of their 
personal data and that only the minimum nec-
essary information should be sought and used 
for the performance of the function to which it 
relates. 
All privacy-relevant data processing including 
the legal, technical and organisational setting 
can be understood and reconstructed at any 
time. The information has to be available be-
fore, during and after the processing takes 
place. Mechanisms for achieving or supporting 
transparency comprise logging and reporting. 
Policy and consent compliance: the whole 
system ± including data flows, data stores, and 
processes ± has to inform the data subject about 
WKHV\VWHP¶VSULYDF\SROLF\RUDOORZWKHGDWD
subject to specify consent in compliance with 
legislation, before users access the system 
Intervenability / Intervention is possible concerning all ongoing 
or planned privacy-relevant data processing, in 
particular by those persons whose data are pro-
cessed.  
The objective is the application of corrective 
measures and counterbalances where necessary.  
Mechanisms for intervenability comprise estab-
lished processes for influencing or stopping the 
data processing fully or partially, manually 
overturning an automated decision, data porta-
bility precautions to prevent lock-in at a data 
processor, breaking glass policies, single points 
RI FRQWDFW IRU LQGLYLGXDOV¶ LQWHUYHQWLRQ UH
quests, switches for users to change a setting 
6 
2.2 Threat Modelling: LINDDUN and ENISA 
In LINDDUN [5], each identified privacy protection goal or canon corresponds to a 
technology threat from which, siPLODUO\ WR 0LFURVRIW¶V 675,'( WKH DFURQ\P RI
LINDDUN is derived: Linkability, Indentifiability, Non-repudiation, Detectability, 
Disclosure of information, content Unawareness, policy and consent Non-compliance, 
as exemplified in Table 2. Each threat to an item of interest (hereafter IoI), understood 
variably as a user, action, content etc., is defined from the perspective of the attacker. 
7KXVµOLQNDELOLW\¶PHDQVEHLQJDEOHWRHVWDEOLVKZKHWKHUWZR,R,VDUHUHODWHGµ,GHQWL
ILDELOLW\¶PHDQVFRQQHFWLQJDXVHUWRDQ,R,µ1RQ-UHSXGLDWLRQ¶DOORZVSURYLQJWKDWD
XVHUKDVSHUIRUPHGDJLYHQDFWLRQµ'HWHFWDELOLW\¶PHDQVWKDWDQ,R,H[LVWVµ,QIRUPDWLRQ
GLVFORVXUH¶ UHIHUV WR ORVVRIFRQILGHQWLDOLW\ µ&RQWHQWXQDZDUHQHVV¶PHDQV WKDWHLWKHU
too much, or the wrong information has been disclosed, leading to the identification of 
ZURQJGHFLVLRQV)LQDOO\ µSROLF\DQGFRQVHQW QRQ-FRPSOLDQFH¶ LQGLFDWHV WKHFDVH LQ
which a system disregards the privacy policy it purports to respect. 
Table 2. LINDDUN privacy threat modelling 
Privacy canons (LINDDUN) Threats to canons 
Hard privacy 
Unlinkability Linkability 
Anonymity and Pseudonimity Identifiability 
Plausible deniability Non-repudiation 
Undetectability and unobservability Detectability 
Confidentiality Disclosure of information 
Soft privacy 
Content awareness Content unawareness 
Policy and consent compliance Policy and consent non-compliance 
 
LINDDUN follows the same steps as STRIDE (but does not reach the stage of risk 
analysis). Therefore, the most fundamental step is the identification of data flow dia-
grams, i.e. the essential sub-units to which the threats are applied [5]. Based on such 
associations, it becomes easier to study mitigation strategies, e.g. in the form of PETs 
applying PbD.  
Danezis et al. [6] do not explicitly propose a privacy threat model. Yet, the only 
protection goal identified in the study conducted by Danezis et al. under the aegis of 
the ENISA [6] that was not considered by LINDDUN is intervenability, the threat to 
which can be identified, with a good degree of confidence, in non-intervenability, un-
derstood as the inability or impossibility to intervene at any level of the system to pre-
vent or mitigate a threat. 
Instead of threat modelling, Danezis et al. [6] propose design strategies safeguarding 
the protection goals which either apply directly to the data (data-oriented strategies) or 
apply to procedures (process-oriented strategies), following the work of Hoepman. In 
detail, a system of data processing should first of all (following Gürses, Troncoso and 
Diaz) minimize the amount of data, hide it from view, store data in separate batches, 
and aggregate data whenever possible. A system of data processing should enable its 
©2018 Maria Grazia Porcedda 7 
controllers to inform individuals whose data are being collected, enforce the rules, and 
demonstrate their enforcement; moreover, it should enable both controllers and indi-
viduals to control how the system works and to question the data.  
6RPH RI WKHVH SUDFWLFHV FRUUHVSRQG GLUHFWO\ WR SURWHFWLRQ JRDOV µLQIRUP¶ FRUUH
VSRQGVWRWUDQVSDUHQF\µKLGH¶WRFRQILGHQWLDOLW\DQGµFRQWURO¶WRLQWHUYHQDELOLW\$VD
result, they can be easily linked to threats. Yet, the other actions can also be linked to a 
SURWHFWLRQJRDODQGWKHUHIRUHDWKUHDWµ6HSDUDWH¶ZKHUHE\GDWDVKRXOGEHSURFHVVHGLQ
FRPSDUWPHQWV FDQEH FRQQHFWHG WR WKHJRDO RI XQOLQNDELOLW\6LPLODUO\ µPLQLPL]H¶
whereby only the necessary categories of data are collected, enables pseudonimity (and 
DQRQ\PLW\µ$JJUHJDWH¶ZKLFKHQFRXUDJHVWRSURFHVVGDWDDWWKHKLJKHVWOHYHORIDJ
gregation and hence the minimum degree of detail, also pursues unlinkability. Inter-
venability is enabled by WKHVWUDWHJLHVµFRQWURO¶µHQIRUFH¶DQGµGHPRQVWUDWH¶ZKLFKFDQ
be seen as three different stages of intervention. The link between privacy protection 
goals, design strategies and threats is illustrated in Table 3. Two design strategies could 
be linked to two different protection goals: control to intervenability and transparency; 
minimise to unlinkability and transparency DVLQ/,1''81¶VFRQWHQWDZDUHQHVV. 
Table 3. Relationship between protection goals, design strategies and threats 
Privacy protection goals Design strategies Threats 
Unlinkability- Anonymity and 
Pseudonymity -Undetectability 
and unobservability 
Aggregate, minimise, 
separate  
Linkability ± Identifiability ± 
Detectability 
Plausible deniability  Non-repudiation 
Integrity* Control? Tampering 
Confidentiality* Hide Disclosure of information 
Availability*  Denial of Service 
Transparency Inform 
Minimise? 
Content unawareness - Policy 
and consent non-compliance 
Intervenability Control, enforce, 
demonstrate 
Non-intervenability  
 
The authors of LINDDUN [5] did not develop their privacy principles starting from the 
DSSOLFDEOHODZEXWUDWKHUIURP6RORYH¶VOLVWRISULYDF\SULQFLSOHVZKLFKFRQIODWHVSUL
vacy (i.e. private life) with data protection. As a result, there are some incongruences 
LQWKHLUDQDO\VLV)RULQVWDQFHµQRQ-UHSXGLDWLRQ¶LVVHHQDVDWKUHDWWRSULYDF\<HWQRQ-
repudiation could be deemed to be a threat only in the case of what the authors call hard 
privacy, and only when users actively pursue repudiation. In all other cases, non-repu-
diation is desirable because it is key to the accountability of data controllers. The prob-
lem, in my view, derives from conflating private life with data protection, which leads 
to overlooking their respective subtleties. 
Danezis et al. [6] built their system based on the Data Protection Directive [28], and 
hence with a stronger degree of adherence to EU law. Yet, EU law has evolved since 
the Directive. First, new legislation has been adopted, which gives meaning to data 
protection not only as a statutory requirement, but also as a right, clearly independent 
8 
from the right to private life. Second, both rights demand that additional requirements 
be taken into account when developing PbD, requirements that I illustrate in the fol-
lowing. 
 
3 Legal Approaches to PbD in EU Law 
,QWKH(8µSULYDF\¶VSOLWVLQWRWZRFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\SURWHFWHGULJKWVUHVSHFWIRUSULYDWH
and family life, home and communications, and protection of personal data, enshrined 
respectively in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [13]. The two 
rights are fully independent and tend to be mostly complementary but can also display 
clashes (as discussed in the conclusions). 
To further complicate the matter, the requirement to implement PbD is not contained 
in the definition of the right, but rather comes from secondary law, i.e. Art. 25 of the 
General Data Protection Regulation [29] (hereafter GDPR). The GDPR, which imple-
ments the right to the protection of personal data, PbD becomes µGDWDSURWHFWLRQE\
design¶KHUHDIWHU'3E'. Legislation addressing Art. 7 of the Charter, such as the pro-
posed e-Privacy Regulation [30] (which will repeal the e-Privacy Directive), does not 
contain rules on PbD. Nevertheless, the proposed Regulation is a lex specialis of the 
GDPR (draft Art. 1(3)). Therefore, the obligation of the controller to implement by 
design approaches contained in the GDPR should arguably apply to provisions of the 
e-Privacy Regulation, including those addressing confidentiality of communications 
that fulfil Art. 7 of the Charter.5 Moreover, awareness of the interplay between technical 
and legal approaches to the right to private life has value beyond the application of PbD 
requirements, as discussed in the conclusions. 
6HFRQGO\ERWKIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVDUHVXEMHFWWRµSHUPLVVLEOH OLPLWDWLRQV¶LHOLPLWV
defined in Art. 52 (1) of the Charter. Accordingly, the exercise of privacy rights can be 
OLPLWHGIRUWKHVDNHRIµREMHFWLYHVRIJHQHUDOLQWHUHVW¶ZKLFKPXVWEHFOHDUO\ spelled out 
in the law. An example is Art. 23 of the GDPR, which lists, among others, national 
security, the protection of judicial independence, as well as the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. Yet, the limitation of both rights cannot vioODWHWKHµHVVHQFH¶
of the rights. There is an ongoing debate about the meaning of the essence of funda-
mental rights in general, and data protection in particular [14, 15, 16], [31].  
As I will argue in section four, aQ\DWWHPSWWRSXUVHµE\GHVLJQ¶DSSURDFhes in EU 
law needs to come to terms with the dual nature of privacy, as well as the concept of 
the essence, to which I turn now.  
 
                                                          
5
 I am grateful to Marc van Lieshout for his comments, which prompted the clarification of this 
point. 
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3.1 Operationalizing Legal Approaches: the Essence and Boundaries of 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter 
Not only the concept of the essence contained in Art. 52(1) of the Charter is not defined, 
but also the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter CJEU) has yet to provide 
a univocal interpretation on the matter. In the case law of the right to the protection of 
personal data, for instance, the CJEU seems to opt for a substantive understanding of 
the essence [31], that is a specific entitlement enabled by the right; following the case 
law of the CJEU, this entitlement should be expressed in a rule [31].  
In the absence of guidance by the CJEU to identify the essence, I have borrowed the 
PHWKRGIRUVHOHFWLQJWKHµDWWULEXWHV¶RIDULJKWWKDWZDVGHYHORSHGE\WKH812IILFHRI
the High Commissioner on Human Rights (hereafter OHCHR) in the context of work 
on indicators [32], a method that was also implemented by the UK Equality and Human 
Rights Commission on which I rely for private life [33]. Attributes are the intrinsic and 
distinctive substantive dimensions of a right, which define its boundary; in turn, the 
essence is the µFRUH¶of an attribute [31]. In other words, appraising the intrusion into 
fundamental rights entails answering the question: what does that fundamental right 
mean? It obliges one to perform the exercise, in the abstract, of dissecting the right into 
its substantive characteristics or attributes. Such an exercise, in turn, allows identifying 
the essence of the right (through a value-based approach [31]), the intrusion into which 
is legally prohibited.  
,QGHWDLODWWULEXWHVDUH³DOLPLWHGQXPEHURIFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI>DJLYHQ@ULJKW´«
To the extent feasible, the attributes should be based on an exhaustive reading of the 
standard, starting with the provisions in the core international human rights treaties; 
«WKHDWWULEXWHVRIWKHKXPDQULJKWVKRXOGFROOHFWLYHO\UHIOHFWWKHHVVHQFHRILWVQRU
PDWLYHFRQWHQW7RWKHH[WHQWIHDVLEOHWKHDWWULEXWHV¶VFRSHVKRXOGQRWRYHUODS´[32]. 
$WWULEXWHVUHSUHVHQWWKHV\QWKHVLVRIZKDWZRXOGRWKHUZLVHEHWKHµQDUUDWLYH¶RQOHJDO
standards of a human right. Note that I borrow from the OHCHR only the method 
(which was supported by the Fundamental Rights Agency [34]), and not the under-
standing of rights, which is rooted instead in EU law.  
To be sure, the attempt WRLGHQWLI\µSULQFLSOHV¶V\QWKHWL]LQJWKHWZRULJKWVLVDQDS
proach followed by different commentators, and stems historically from the formula-
tion of both rights (e.g. the fair information principles concerning data protection), as 
well as the national and international case law on both rights [31]. Nevertheless, the 
scholars who have attempted the enterprise have neither singled out principles for both 
Art. 7 and 8 as understood in EU law, nor have they systematically identified the es-
sence [15, 16], [35, 36], leaving an important gap in the literature. In the next two sec-
tions I synthetize the steps I followed to elaborate the attributes and essence of the right 
to respect for private life [12], and the protection of personal data [31]. The identifica-
tion of attributes and essence is in turn instrumental to link the legal understanding of 
the rights with the technical approach to DPbD/PbD.  
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3.2 Attributes and Essence of Article 7 of the Charter 
Elsewhere [12] I have distilled the attributes for the right to private and family life 
starting from the Human Rights Measurement Framework developed by the UK Equal-
ity and Human Rights Commission [33] duly modified to take into account the speci-
ficity of EU law. Accordingly, Art. 7 of the Charter is read in the light of Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) [37], which represents 
the minimum standard for the substantive understanding of the right, as well as the 
benchmark to assess permissible limitations (in harmony with Art. 52(3) of the Char-
ter). I also argue that the scope of the right in EU law is different from Art. 8 ECHR; in 
particular, Art. 7 does neither concern the protection of personal data, nor physical in-
tegrity in the context of medicine and biology as well as environmental protection, 
which are covered instead by Arts. 3 and 37 of the Charter. 
The specific contents of the attributes are refined on the basis of the case law of the 
following bodies: i) judgments of the CJEU concerning instruments of secondary law 
which give substance to the rights listed in Art 7; the ECHR, insofar as the scope of the 
two rights correspond; and iii) the case law of the UN which, according to settled case 
law, supplies guidelines.  
$UWUHDGV³(YHU\RQHKDVWKHULJKWWRUHVSHFWIRUKLVRUKHUSULYDWHDQGIDPLO\OLIH
home and communications. The definition contains four prongs (private life, family 
life, home and communications) which lead to seven attributes and essence. 
The first prong includes those elements that are relevant to develop and maintain 
RQH¶VSHUVRQDOLW\DQG LGHQWLW\XQGHUVWRRGDVXQLTXHDQGZRUWK\RIHTXDO UHVSHFW ,W
includes three sub-attributes.  
The first is physical and psychological integrity. This includes the forum internum 
RIWKHPLQGLHRQH¶VWKRXJKWVIHHOLQJVDQGHPRWLRQVWKHIRUXPLQWHUQXPRIWKHERG\
meaning genetic characteristics and unique physical traits, and the forum externum of 
WKHERG\WKDWLVWKHULJKWWRRZQRQH¶VERG\DQGSURWHFWLW from undesired or forced 
access to it. This attribute could have as an experimental essence the forum internum 
of the mind and of the body. 
7KHVHFRQGLVSHUVRQDOVRFLDODQGVH[XDOLGHQWLW\ZKLFKFRQVLVWVLQWKHµIRUXPH[
WHUQXP¶RIPHQWDOLQWHJULW\ZKLFK LVVXEVWDQWLDWHGLQWKHFRKHUHQWSRUWUD\DORIRQH¶V
SHUVRQDOLW\DQGLGHQWLW\WRWKHH[WHUQDOZRUOG,WLQFOXGHVFRQWURORYHURQH¶VQDPHWKH
XSNHHSRIRQH¶VUHSXWDWLRQWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIRQH¶VVH[XDORULHQWDWLRQEXWDOVRWKHPDQ
LIHVWDWLRQRIRQH¶VEHOLHIs and personality in the form of attitudes, behaviours and cloth-
LQJ)ROORZLQJWKHFDVH;DQG2WKHUV>@SDUDWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIRQH¶VVH[XDO
identity is a good candidate for the essence. In Opinion 1/15 ([39], para 150), the CJEU 
alludes to the fact that information could constitute the essence of the right, without 
nevertheless providing clear indications. Further candidates for the essence could be 
WKHRIILFLDOUHFRJQLWLRQRIRQH¶VRULJLQDORUDFTXLUHGQDPHDQGWKHIDLWKIXOVRFLDOUHS
resentation RIRQH¶VLGHQWLW\  
The third is personal development, autonomy and participation, which relates to the 
partaking of individuals in the democratic society, which is threefold. The first way is 
WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIRQH¶VSHUVRQDOLW\LQWKHVSLULWRIVHOI-determination; the second way 
LVDXWRQRP\RIRQH¶VPRYHPHQWVDQGDFWLRQVWKHWKLUGZD\LVSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHVRFLDO
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and political life as one sees fit. All three ways require a minimum degree of control, 
even if conducted in public, and embody the possibility to develop social relations of 
an amicable or professional nature. In this sense, this sub-DWWULEXWHFRQFHUQVWKHµRXWHU
FLUFOH¶RIRQH¶VOLIHDQGOLQNVZLWKWKHµLQQHUFLUFOH¶RIRQH¶VIDPLO\,QWKHDEVHQFHRI
clear indications by the Court, a candidate for the essence could be the absence of secret 
external constraints. 
The second prong of the right, family life, leads to one attribute representing the 
µLQQHUFLUFOH¶RQH¶VNLQE\EORRGDQGHOHFWLRQZKLFKUHSUHVHQWVWKHILUVWPRGHRIH[LVW
ence of individuals in society, which predates the state. It includes horizontal and ver-
tical relationships regardless of their seal of legitimacy, and reside in emotional and 
material ties with individuals and surroundings. The CJEU pronounced that, for a fa-
ther, the essence of family life lies in the possibility to apply for the right to custody 
([40], para 55). Other candidates include the continuity and recognition of a relationship 
of care. 
The SURQJµFRPPXQLFDWLRQV¶lies in expressing the ability of individuals to choose 
with whom and how to share information, and the presumption that information shared 
privately should remain confidential, regardless of its content and the mode of commu-
nication. This includes the expectation that information shared privately will not be 
used against the individual. In the case Digital Rights Ireland [41], the CJEU found the 
HVVHQFHWREH³WKHFRQWHQWRIRQH¶V>HOHFWURQLF@FRPPXQLFDWLRQVDVVXFK´SDUD 
The SURQJµKRPH¶ corresponds to the last attribute, which UHIHUVWRRQH¶Vsettled and 
secure place in the community, where individuals can develop ties of an intimate nature 
and nurture self-determination, far away from the public gaze and undesired intrusion. 
The essence of this attribute could be found in a minimum zone of physical intimacy 
(e.g., in a home, the toilet, or the bed). 
 
Table 4. Attributes and essence of Art. 7 of the Charter (µSULYDWHOLIH¶) 
 
Attributes of art. 7 Core 
PL(1) Physical and psychological integ-
rity 
The forum internum of the mind and of the body 
PL(2) Personal social and sexual iden-
tity 
7KHH[SUHVVLRQRIRQH¶VVH[XDOLGHQWLW\&-(8 
2IILFLDOUHFRJQLWLRQRIRQH¶VRULJLQDORUDFTXLUHGQDPH 
)DLWKIXOVRFLDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRQH¶VLGHQWLW\ 
PL(3) Personal development, autonomy 
DQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQµRXWHUFLUFOH¶ 
Absence of secret external constraints 
Family For a father, the possibility to apply for the right to 
custody (CJEU) 
Continuity of relationship of care 
Recognition of relationship of care 
Communications The FRQWHQWRIRQH¶VFRPPXQLFDWLRQV&-(8 
Home A minimum zone of physical intimacy 
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3.3 Attributes and Essence of Article 8 of the Charter 
Attempts to identify the attribute and the essence of Art. 8 of the Charter are scant [16] 
and non-conclusive, as I discuss in [31]. Hence, I identified the attributes and essence 
of the right to the protection of personal data based on the method developed by the 
OHCHR, and a value-based approach to the right. Differently from the right to private 
life, the right to the protection of personal data does not derive from the ECHR, and 
should be read instead in the light of article 52(2) of the Charter, whereby the interpre-
tation of the CJEU of EU secondary law has preeminent importance in defining the 
contents of the right.6 In this case, the case law of the ECHR on Convention 108 [43] 
RQHRIWKHVRXUFHVRIWKHULJKWµVXSSOLHVJXLGHOLQHV¶LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKVHWWOHGFDVH
law.  
$UWLVFRPSRVHGRIWKUHHSDUDJUDSKVZKLFKUHDG³(YHU\RQHKDVWKHULJKWWRWKH
protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly 
for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some 
other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which 
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compli-
DQFHZLWKWKHVHUXOHVVKDOOEHVXEMHFWWRFRQWUROE\DQLQGHSHQGHQWDXWKRULW\´7KHWKUHH
paragraphs contained in the formulation of the right to the protection of personal data 
lead to 4 attributes; the rationale is explained in [31]. 
The fist limb of Art. 8(2) embodies the attribute of legitimate processing. This at-
tribute expresses the expectation for the data subject that the processing must be legit-
imate, which refers to three interconnected principles stemming from the rule of law, 
namely fairness and transparency, purpose limitation (& storage limitation), and lawful 
legal basis. In para 150 of Opinion 1/15 [39], the CJEU found that rules concerning 
purpose limitation constitute the essence of the right. 
7KHVHFRQGOLPERI$UWFRQFHUQVGDWDVXEMHFWV¶ULJKWVZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGWRRQH
VLQJOHDWWULEXWHGDWDVXEMHFWV¶FRQWURORYHUWKHLUSHUVRQDOGDWDHQDEOLQJWKHPWRLQWHU
vene in the processing. It includes the following steps, which should be seen as a range 
of options available to the data subject depending on the situation: i) accessing the data 
and obtaining a copy; ii) rectifying inaccurate data; iii) objecting to processing, includ-
ing profiling; iv) restricWLQJWKHSURFHVVLQJRIRQH¶VSHUVRQDOGDWD:KLOVWWKH&-(8KDV
yet to identify the essence concerning this attribute, a candidate is the right to access. 
Milder options are the right to rectify and object to profiling.  
Art. 8(3), which concerns oversight, paves the way to7 the attribute of supervisory 
authority, which concerns the ability of the individual to claim without hindrance the 
intervention of an authority for the protection of his or her right. This attribute embodies 
a form of legal remedy.8  
                                                          
6
 This is because the CJEU has found, in ground 69 of Google Spain and Google (42. Judgment 
of 13 May 2014 in Google Spain and Google, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317,  (2014)), that re-
TXLUHPHQWVRI$UWLFOHDQGRIWKH&KDUWHU³DUHLPSOHPHQWHGLQWHUDOLD´E\SURYLVLRQV
contained in the DPD. I justify my argument in [31]. 
7
  See footnote above. 
8
 Note that the CJEU invalidated the Safe Harbour Agreement in Schrems [44] on grounds of 
disrespect of this requirement, which it found to be the essence of the right to effective judicial 
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The combination of Art. 8(3), literature and international law [31], could also support 
the attribute µKXPDQLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ZKHUHE\GHFLVLRQVVLJQLILFDQWO\DIIHFWLQJDQLQGL
vidual cannot be taken by a machine, and that a human being must be involved in the 
process. A potential essence of this attribute is the right to obtain human intervention 
on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the auto-
mated decision (a requirement poised to become essential with further expansions of 
datafication and applications of data science).  
The last attribute, data security and minimization, stems from secondary law (but is 
an old fair information principle), but can be linked to Art. 8(1), as it expresses essential 
components of the right [31]. It embodies the expectation to trust that personal infor-
mation is protected against risks of a varying nature and likelihood, which could effect 
physical, material and non-material damage. It further includes the right to communi-
cate the minimum amount of personal data possible for a given purpose.9 In Digital 
Rights Ireland (para 40) and Opinion 1/15 (para 150) the CJEU found the essence in 
the provision of integrity, confidentiality and security safeguards in the legal basis re-
lied upon for the processing of personal data. 
As a last note, sensitive data should not be seen as an attribute, nor as the essence of 
data protection, but rather as a requirement that automatically lowers the threshold of 
permissible interferences.10 
Table 5. Attributes of Art. 8 of the Charter (data protection) 
Attributes Essence  
Legitimate processing Purpose limitation (CJEU) 
'DWDVXEMHFWV¶ULJKWV Access (Experimental);  
Rectification and objecting to profiling (experimental) 
Supervisory authority   
Human intervention The right to obtain human intervention on the part of the 
controller, to express his or her point of view and to con-
test the decision (Experimental) 
Security and minimization The provision of security safeguards in the legal basis re-
lied upon for the processing of personal data (CJEU) 
 
The identification of attributes and essence enables us to link the legal understanding 
of the rights with the technical understanding of privacy/data protection goals (and re-
lated threat scenarios), onto which I move next.  
 
                                                          
protection enshrined in Art. 47 of the Charter, with no mention to the essence of the protection 
of personal data. 
9
  In the version of WKLVUHVHDUFKGLVFXVVHGDWWKHFRQIHUHQFH,KDGSURSRVHGµPLQLPL]DWLRQDQG
DFFXUDF\¶DVDVHSDUDWHattribute. While accuracy is very well expressed by the requirement to 
rectify the data, which is part of GDWDVXEMHFWV¶ULJKWVWKHTXHVWLRQUHPDLQVDVWRwhether data 
minimization should form part of a different attribute. The importance of minimization as a 
prerequisite for Privacy by Design is well argued, for instance, by Gürses, Troncoso and Diaz 
[45].  
10
  That is, by making the interference of limitations to the right automatically serious. 
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4 Blending Legal and Technical Approaches to Privacy  
Any DWWHPSW WRSXUVXH µE\GHVLJQ¶ LQ(8 ODZQHHGV WRFRPH WR WHUPVZLWK WKHGXDO
QDWXUHRISULYDF\DVZHOODVWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHHVVHQFH7KLVLVEHFDXVHµE\GHVLJQ¶
approaches will always be confronted with privacy and data protection not just as stat-
utory requirements, but as rights, too.11  The use of personal data-driven technology, in 
fact, always engenders the competition between the two fundamental rights and objec-
tives of general interests. If the data controller is a private individual, and therefore 
technology is used for business purposes, the protection of personal data and the right 
to respect for private life stand in dialogue with the objective of general interest of 
developing an internal market as well as the rights and freedoms of others, which find 
MRLQWH[SUHVVLRQLQWKHFRQWUROOHU¶VIUHHGRPWRFRQGXFWDEXVLQHVV$UWRIWKH&KDU
ter). If the data controller is a law enforcement official, and therefore technology is used 
to support the fight against crime, the protection of personal data and the right to respect 
for private life stand in dialogue with the objective of general interest of public security, 
and the rights and freedoms of others.  
To answer the research question, which concerns the way how DPbD/PbD ap-
proaches can incorporate the understanding of privacy as two rights and the ensuing 
requirement of respecting their essence, I propose to map the interaction between pro-
tection goals and attributes. Actually, there are more connections between the legal and 
technical concepts than may appear at first sight: the essence is to law what protection 
goals are to technology, namely a boundary which cannot be crossed, lest violating the 
right.  
 
4.1 Legal and technical approaches to private life 
As for private life, Table 7 shows the correspondences between privacy protection goals 
and the attributes for respect for private and family life. The first column to the left lists 
the attributes. The second column lists the essence relating to an attribute, if any (those 
found by the Court aUHPDUNHGZLWKWKHDFURQ\Pµ&-(8¶WKHRQHV,DPSURSRVLQJDUH
PDUNHGDVµ([S¶IRUH[SHULPHQWDO7KHWKLUGOLVWVWKHSULYDF\SURWHFWLRQJRDOVRUFDQ
ons, corresponding to each attribute. The fourth and last column lists the corresponding 
design strategy. 
The attribute of communications concerns the ability to share information with other 
individuals, under the presumption that information shared privately should remain 
confidential, regardless of its content and the mode of communication, and with the 
expectation that information shared privately will not be used against the individual. 
                                                          
11
  I believe this reflection addresses the important point raised by Bieker et al. [10], whereby the 
risk management performed in the context of technology is different than that performed in 
the case of privacy rights, because the first enables to factor in some risks, whereas the latter 
does not. While in abstract this is the case, in practice, particularly in the case of Art. 8, the 
applicable law allows to factor in a degree of risk. This is the case, for instance, of personal 
data breaches, which need to be notified only when they entail an appreciable risk to the rights 
and freedoms of data subjects (Art. 33 GDPR). I articulate the many reasons for this in [46]. 
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The content of communications represents, for the CJEU, an element of essence. This 
attribute is also of central importance for information security, and corresponds to con-
fidentiality, which possibly carries with it the desirability of plausible deniability, for 
instance in the case of a whistle-blower wishing to deny her or his actions.  
The attribute home, which UHIHUVWRRQH¶VVHWWOHGDQGVHFXUHSODFHLQWKHFRPPXQLW\
where individuals can develop ties of an intimate nature and nurture self-determination, 
far away from the public gaze and undesired intrusion, is also enhanced by confidenti-
ality, e.g. in the case of measures of surveillance (e.g. listening devices, cameras etc.), 
DQGWKXVFDOOVIRUWKHGHVLJQVWUDWHJ\µKLGH¶SDUWLFXODUO\LQUHODWLRQWRDPLQLPXP]RQH
RISK\VLFDOLQWLPDF\8QOLQNDELOLW\DVWKHVWUDWHJ\µVHSDUDWH¶ZRXOGHQDEOHWRGLVFDUG
information violating the essence.  
 
Table 6.   Relationship between privacy canons and attributes of article 7 
 
Attributes of Art. 7 Core Protection goal Design 
strategy 
Private life See sub-attributes  / 
i.Physical and 
psychological integrity 
The forum internum of the 
mind and of the body 
/ / 
ii.Personal social and 
sexual identity 
7KH H[SUHVVLRQ RI RQH¶V
sexual identity (CJEU) 
2IILFLDO UHFRJQLWLRQ RI RQH¶V
original or acquired name; 
Faithful social representation 
RIRQH¶VLGHQWLW\ 
/ / 
iii.Personal development, 
autonomy and 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ µRXWHU
FLUFOH¶ 
Absence of secret external 
constraints 
/ / 
Family For a father, the possibility to 
apply for the right to custody 
(CJEU) 
Continuity of relationship of 
care; 
Recognition of relationship of 
care 
/ / 
Communications 7KH FRQWHQW RI RQH¶V
communications (CJEU) 
 
Confidentiality 
[Plausible 
deniability] 
Authentication/a
uthorization 
Hide 
Home A minimum zone of physical 
intimacy 
[Unlinkability 
confidentiality] 
Separate 
Hide 
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4.2 Legal and technical approaches to the protection of personal data 
Table 8 shows the correspondences between protection goals and the attributes of per-
sonal data protection. The first column to the left lists the attributes of the right. The 
second column lists cores relating to an attribute, if any (the essence found by the Court 
LVPDUNHGZLWKWKHDFURQ\Pµ&-(8¶ZKHUHDVWKHHVVHQFH,SURSRVHGLVPDUNHGZLWK
µ([S¶ZKLFKVWDQGVIRUH[SHULPHQWDO7KHWKLUGOLVWVWKHSULYDF\SURWHFWLRQJRDOVRU
canons, corresponding to each attribute, while the fourth column shows the design ap-
proach corresponding to the protection goal. 
7KHDWWULEXWHµOHJLWLPDWHSURFHVVLQJ¶LQFOXGHVWKUHHUHTXLUHPHQWVWZRRIZKLFKUH
late to a canon. Fairness and transparency corresponds to transparency (particularly in 
the LINDDUN sense of policy and consent compliance) in a self-explanatory manner. 
Purpose limitation, which also expresses a core of the right, relates to confidentiality 
and the design strategy hide, in that data which is not disclosed to unauthorized parties 
is less likely to be processed unlawfully. It also relates to unlinkability, in that personal 
data kept in separate batches, aggregated, or minimized is also less likely to be pro-
cessed without authorization. Confidentiality and unlinkability would be therefore im-
portant canons to comply with the essence.  
7KHDWWULEXWHµGDWDVXEMHFW¶VULJKWV¶DVDZKROHUHODWHVWR intervenability and trans-
parency (in the LINDDUN sense of content awareness) and the design strategLHVµFRQ
WURO¶DQG µLQIRUP¶7KHVWHSµDFFHVV¶UHODWHVWRintervenability (control) and availability 
RIWKHGDWDZKHUHDVµUHFWLILFDWLRQ¶UHODWHVWRLQWHJULW\DQGQRQ-repudiation of the data. 
The steps objection, particularly to profiling, and rejection, concern unlinkability; ob-
jection calls, in particular, for separation. Rejection could call for minimize (e.g. anon-
\PL]DWLRQRIWKHGDWDRUDQHZGHVLJQVWUDWHJ\HJµGHOHWH¶ 
Oversight, expressed by two attributes, is linked to intervenability, i.e. the possibility 
to request and apply corrective measures and counterbalances where necessary, and the 
design strategy control. Note that intervenability presupposes non-repudiation, which 
pertains to information security and means the ability to prevent a sender from denying 
later that he or she sent a message or performed an action, so that liability can be at-
tributed. Intervenability and the related strategy of control would be important require-
ments to satisfy the experimental notion of the essence I propose here. Note that these 
findings support an important lesson against believing that DPbD/PbD can be an easy 
fix to compliance with privacy rights, as expressed for instance by Pagallo [7], Koops 
and Leenes [1] and Kamara [8]. 
Security calls for availability, confidentiality and intervenability, and the related de-
sign strategies hide and control. Minimization relates to unlinkability (in the self-ex-
SODQDWRU\IRUPRIµPLQLPLVH¶ 
Finally, sensitive data, which is not, per se, an attribute, but rather lowers the thresh-
old of permissible limitations, is supported by unlinkability and the design strategy sep-
arate, as well as confidentiality and the design strategy hide, for the same reasons that 
apply to the attributes discussed above. In addition, plausible deniability may be very 
important to protect sensitive data, and hence exercise other rights freely. 
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Table 7. Relationship between privacy canons and attributes of Article 8 
 
 
 Attributes of Art. 8 Essence  Protection goals Design 
strategies 
Le
gi
tim
a
te
 
pr
o
ce
ss
in
g 
Lawful legal basis   / 
Fairness and transpar-
ency 
 Transparency (policy & 
consent compliance) 
Inform 
Purpose limitation Purpose limitation 
[CJEU] 
Confidentiality 
Unlinkability  
Intervenability 
Hide 
Separate 
(minimize, 
aggregate) 
Demonstrate 
'D
WD
VXE
MHF
WV¶
ULJ
KWV
 
 
 Intervenability 
Transparency 
 
Control 
Inform 
Access Access [Exp] Availability 
Non-repudiation 
Integrity 
 
Rectify  
Object objecting to 
profiling [Exp] 
Unlinkability Separate 
Restrict  Unlinkability / 
O
ve
rs
ig
ht
 
i. Supervisory 
authority* 
 Intervenability 
(Non-repudiation!) 
Control 
 ii. Human intervention The right to obtain 
human 
intervention on the 
part of the 
controller, to 
express his or her 
point of view and 
to contest the 
decision [Exp] 
Intervenability 
(Non-repudiation!) 
Control 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
a
n
d 
m
in
im
iz
a
tio
n
 
Security 
 
 
 
 
Minimization 
CJEU: The 
provision of 
security 
safeguards in the 
legal basis relied 
upon for the 
processing of 
personal data 
Confidentiality 
Availability,  
Intervenability 
 
 
Unlinkability 
Transparency 
Hide 
 
Control 
 
 
Minimize 
 Sensitive data: lowers the threshold of 
permissible interferences 
Unlinkability, 
confidentiality 
[Plausible deniability] 
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4.3 Considerations: essence, attributes and obligations of the data 
controller 
The analysis carried out allows drawing some conclusions. The first is that two design 
strategies - hide and separate (minimize, aggregate) - and the corresponding protection 
goals ± confidentiality and unlinkability - seem crucial for respecting the proposed no-
tions of the essence of both rights. In addition, respecting the essence of Art. 8 calls for 
the design strategy control and the protection goal intervenability. 
However, in both cases, not all potential notions of the essence seem to be matched 
by an existing design strategy; similarly, not all attributes seem to be matched by a 
protection goal. The case could be different, however, if all information security canons 
(see Section 2) had been taken into account. By means of example, the information 
secuULW\FDQRQµXWLOLW\¶ZKHUHE\WKHLQIRUPDWLRQLVUHOHYDQWDQGXVHIXOIRUWKHSXUSRVH
for which it is needed [24], links both with the attributes of private life (Art. 7) and the 
attributeVGDWDVXEMHFWV¶ULJKWVDQG security and minimization (Art. 8). As a result, there 
is room for further developing privacy protection goals and design strategies. 
Moreover, some design strategies described in section 2 seem underrepresented (e.g. 
enforce, demonstrate). Yet, it does not follow that the missing protection goals and 
design strategies are superfluous. In the case of data protection, the reason why some 
protection goals and design strategies are missing is that they express obligations of the 
data controller. Such duties do not feature in the definition of the right but are actually 
implied by them in the form of (data protection) principles in the applicable law. For 
instance, the two attributes of data protection which express oversight relate to the prin-
ciple of accountability, which links to the protection goal of intervenability, and the 
strategies µenforce¶ and µdemonstrate¶. Similarly, the sub-DWWULEXWHµUHFWLI\¶UHODWHVWR
the principle of accuracy, which expresses the duty to ensure that data are adequate, 
relevant and not excessive, which is fulfilled by the protection goal integrity.  
The conclusion is that DPbD/PbD approaches should take into account both the def-
inition of the rights, which represent a minimum threshold, and the applicable law 
which implements the right and lays down corresponding duties. The mapping between 
protection goals, essence and attributes, should be complemented by an equivalent 
mapping between protection goals and the obligations of the data controller stemming 
from the applicable law, as exemplified in Table 8. As a result, further protection goals 
and design strategies could be added (e.g. to embrace the important principle of mini-
mization [45, 48], or protect the essence). 
Table 8. Comprehensive approach to PbD/DPbD 
Essence Attribute Principles ex-
pressed in the law 
Duties of data con-
troller 
Protection goal Protection goal Protection goal Protection goal 
Design strategy Design strategy Design strategy Design strategy 
Right   
                          Secondary law 
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5 Conclusions and further research  
In this paper I tackled the question, currently unaddressed in the literature, of how to 
reconcile the technical understanding of µSULYDF\E\GHVLJQ¶ with the nature of the rights 
to private life and data protection in EU law, whose essence cannot be violated. My 
proposition was to map the equivalences between, on the one hand, the legal under-
standing of the attributes and essence of the fundamental rights to private life and data 
protection with, on the other hand, the technical notion of privacy protection goals de-
veloped in privacy threat modelling.  
The analysis unveiled hidden connections between the legal and technical concepts: 
the essence is to law what protection goals are to technology, namely a boundary which 
cannot be crossed, lest violating the right. As a result, the identification of the concept 
of the essence and subsequent linking with privacy protection goals eases the imple-
mentation of µE\GHVLJQ¶DSSURDFKHVLQ(8,QGHHGWKHGHVLJQVWUDWHJLHVKLGHVHSDUDWH
(minimize, aggregate) and control, and the corresponding protection goals confidenti-
ality, unlinkability and intervenability, seem crucial for respecting the proposed notions 
of the essence of the two rights.  
The analysis also showed mismatches between, first, attributes and essence, and sec-
ond, protection goals and design strategies, suggesting there is a need to further develop 
the latter, e.g. by considering other information security canons (and related threats), as 
well as to take a comprehensive approach to PbD/DPbD. This means taking into ac-
count both the definition of the rights, which represent a minimum threshold, and the 
applicable law which implements the right and lays down corresponding duties. Such 
a comprehensive approach, could be applied beyond building privacy-compliant tech-
nology. 
First, a comprehensive approach can be used to unveil existing tensions inherent in 
technological design, not just among protection goals, but also between and among 
rights. For instance, while non-repudiation can be of crucial importance for personal 
data protection, it can be problematic for confidential communications, because it ne-
gates plausible deniability, which is important for confidentiality (e.g. of a whistle-
blower). Hence, there can be a clash between personal data protection and private life 
(which testifies to their independence). Clashes may also appear within a right: plausi-
ble deniability may be very important to protect the meta-attribute of sensitive data, and 
hence exercise other rights freely, but is at odds with the other attributes of the right. 
Secondly, a comprehensive DPbD/PbD approach which takes into account also in-
formation security canons/threats can underpin tensions in the fight against cybercrimes 
(understood as data crimes [47]), thus informing the development of informed and sus-
tainable approaches to cybersecurity, as I illustrate in [12] in relation to an off-the-shelf 
intrusion detection and prevention system for universities. 
Finally, the comprehensive approach can be used to perform meaningful impact as-
sessment of technologies (as in [10], [25]) and policies. The attribute and essence can 
be used as a powerful instrument to capture the granularity of the intrusiveness of tech-
nologies and policies addressing public security into any fundamental rights (hence be-
yond data protection, as discussed in section 3), whilst protection goals and design strat-
egies could be used as a corrective approach, as I intend to show in future research.  
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